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SVMMARY 
Chapter 1 ·describes  the  evolution  of the  current  Community  Excise  System.  This 
system  was  introduced  on  1 January  1993  and  covers  tobacco  products,  alcohol  and 
alcoholic  beverages  and  mineral  oils.  It provides  common  structures  for  taxation  by 
Member States, with a system of mi~imum  rates and harmonised procedures for holding . 
and movement of excisable goods. 
The review reguirement,  which is laid down  in  a series of directives .setting  minimum 
rates of duty, is described in Chapter 2.  The review must examine the rates of duty in 
the light of the functioning of the Internal Market, the real value of the duty rates and the 
wider objectives of the Treaty.  It is  noted in this chapter that the relevant issues vary 
considerably,  and  that there is a  need  for development of a longer-term excise policy. 
The overall conclusion is that action should be postponed pending a wider analysis of the 
range of relevant issues. 
Ci~arettes are covered in  Chapter 3.  Here it is  noted  that  the structure of cigarette 
excise duty  must be examined,  though  the current view  is  that  no  adjustment is  being 
recommended at this stage. 
· Chapter 4 deals with other tobacco ProdUCts.  Here, it is noted that further consideration 
should be given  to  the relationship between  tobacco products,  not  least because health 
arguments would support increased taxation of hand-rolling tobacco. 
Chapter 5 addresses  alcohol  and  alcoholic  beveraies.  Here  it  is  noted  that  wine  is 
subject to a zero rate.  Adjustment of the positive rate without a corresponding measure 
for  wine could  lead  to  competitive distortions.  On  the  other hand,  introduction  of a 
positive rate for wine may be ill-timed, given current reform of the CAP in  this sector. 
Hence,  the question of adjustment of minimum  rates  for  alcohol  products is  deferred, 
pending further analysis and consultation. 
Mineral oils are dealt with in Chamer 6.  Here again,  is it noted  that a wide range of 
pOtentially conflicting issues arise, particularly in the context of heating fuels,  where the 
absence of a duty  on  some competing products raises  similar competitive problems  to 
that of wine in  the alcohol sector.  Thus again,  action  in  this area is deferred  pending 
further discussion and assessment. 4 
EXCISE Du'fY RATES REVIEW 
1.  THE COMMVNITY ExCISE SYSTEM 
a)  Background 
1.1  Ex.cise  duties  are  long-standing  taxes  on  consumption,  generally  applied  to 
consumable goods such as tobacco and alcohol products, and mineral oils.  T-hey 
usually are applied  as  a specific amount of tax  for a given  quantity of product 
(though  this is not always the case:  for example,  excise duty on cigarettes now 
consists of a specific element and an ad valorem element - i.e. a percentage of the 
value).  A duty liability exists  when  the goods are produced or when  they  are 
imported  into  the  Community.  However,  payment  of the  duty  is  normally 
suspended until such time as the goods are released for consumption. In line with 
this  prinCiple,  the  excise  duty  has  always  accrued  to  the  Member  State  of 
consumption. 
1.2  Excise  duties  provide  an  important  source of revenue  for  the  Member  States, 
representing between 2.3% and 6%  of Gross Domestic Product (and between 5% 
and  16%  of total  tax  receipts)  - see  Annex  A.  The rates  of duty  imposed  by 
Member  States  have  traditionally  differed  widely,  reflecting  varying  national 
considerations and policies. 
1.3  Prior  to  the  Internal  Market,  excisable  goods  could  be  held  in  an  excise 
warehouse,  and  moved  between  warehouses  in  different  Member  States  under 
suspension of duty,  with frontier checks being used  to control such  movements. 
Such a system facilitated the principle of payment of duty in the Member State of 
consumption.  Clearly,  under Internal Market conditions,  frontier .checks  would 
no  longer  be possible  and  a  new  means· of controlling  movements  would  be 
needed·. 
b)  Evolution of the current system 
1.4  In  its  1985  White  Paper on  Completing  the  Internal  Market, 1  the  Commission 
concluded that fully  harmonised ex<;ise rates for the main categories of excisable 
goods, i.e. tobacco products, alcohol products and mineral oils were desirable for 
the  completion  of the  Internal  Market.  Consequently,  the  original  legal  texts 
proposed by the Commission in  1987 sugg'ested such a system. 2 
1.5  The subsequent debate on those proposals led to a recognition by Council and the 
Commission that complete rate harmonisation was  not necessary for the creation 
of the Internal Market.  What was required, however, was a system which, on  the 
1  COM(85) 310 Final 
2  - COM(87) 0325 of  4/8/87 modified by COM(87) 0325 final/2 (OJ n° C 251  of 19/9/87, p. 3) 
- COM(87) 0326 of  4/8/87 modifi~  by COM(87) 0326 finaV2 (OJ n° C 251 of 19/9/87, p.  4) 
- COM(87) 0327 of  4/8/87 modified by COM(87) 0327 final/2 (OJ n° C 262 of 1/I0/87, p. 8) 
-·  COM(87) 0328 final of  4/8/87 modified by COM(87) 0328 final/2 modified by COM(87) 0328 
final/3 (OJ n° c 250 of 18/9/87, p. 4) s 
one  hand,  gave Member States  flexibility  in  setting  their excise duty rates,  but 
which  on  the other hand  encouraged convergence of rates.  In  1989,  therefore,  · 
the Commission brought forward amended proposals with a view to introducing a 
greater degree of flexibility  for  ~ember States,  particularly  by  replacing  fixed  . 
rates with a system of minimum rates, rate bands and target rates.  3 
1. 6  The  outcome  of the  negotiations  on  these  revised  proposals  was  a  system  of 
common  minimum  rates  which,  subject  to  certain agreed  derogations,  Member 
States  are  obliged  to  respect.  In  addition,  Member  States  gave  a  political 
undertaking  to  treat  the  target  rates  proposed  by  the  Commission  as  reference 
rates towards  ~ltich they would endeavour to adjust their national rates.  Details 
of the minimum rates are shown in Annex B. 
1. 7  In  deciding  to  adopt  a  system  of minimum  rates,  the  Council  clearly  felt  that 
market forces should be the driving force behind rate approximation.  It was also 
considered desirable that each Member State should be free,  in  setting rates  for 
ranges of products which may be in competition with each other, to take account 
of the relative position of those products in that Member State. 
1.8  Thus,  a Community-wide excise duty system was introduced on  1 January 1993, 
as  one  element  of the  creation  of the  Internal  Market.  In  addition  to  the 
minimum rates, the system includes harmonised structures for charging the duty, 
and common rules for holding and movement of excisable goods.  All of the rules 
are set out in a series of directives adopted during the course of 19924• 
1.9  The rules on holding and  movement ensure that excisable goods can  continue to . 
move  between  Member  States  under  a  system  of duty  suspension.  Traders 
wishing  to  move goods  under  this  system  must  be registered  in  their Member 
State  of establishment,  and  an  administrative  document  must  accompany  the 
movement.  In line with  the principles of the Internal Market, increased freedom 
for private individuals to  purchase duty-paid goods in the Member State of their 
3  - COM(89) 0525-01 Final of 19/12/89 (OJ n° C 12 of 18/1/90, p. 4) 
- COM(89) 0525-02 Final of 19/12/89 (OJ n° C 12 of 18/1/90, p. 8) 
- COM(89) 0526 Final of 19/12/89 (OJ n° C 16 of23/l/90, p.  10) 
- COM(89) 0.527 Final of7112/89 (OJ n° C 12 of 18/1/90, p.  12) 
4  -Council Directive 92/12/EEC of2S February 1992 on the general arrangements for products subject to 
excise duty and on the holding, movement and monitoring of  such products (OJ no L 76, 23/3/91, p.  1) 
as amended by Council Directive 92/108/EEC of 14 December 1992 (OJ n° L 390, 31/12/92, p.  124) 
- Cowtcil Directive 92n81EEC of 19 October 1992 amending Directives 72/464/EEC and 79/32/EEC on 
taxes other than turnover taxes which are  levied  on  the consumption of manufactured  tobacco  (OJ 
no L 316, 31/10/92, p.  S) 
- Council  Directive  92n9/EEC of 19  October  1992  on the approximation of taxes on cigarettes (OJ 
n° L 316,31/10/92, p. 8) 
- Council  Directive  92/80/EEC of 19  October  1992  on the approximation  of taxes on manufactured 
tobacco other than cigarettes (OJ no L 316, 31/10/92, p.  10) 
- Council  Directive 92/81/EEC of 19  October  1992  on  the harmonisation of the structures of excise 
duties on mineral oils (OJ no L 316, 31/10/92, p.  12) 
- Council Directive 92/82/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of the rates of  excise duties on 
mineral oils (OJ n° L 316, 31/10/92, p.  19) 
- Council  Directive  92/83/EEC of 19  October  1992  on  the  harmonisation of the structures of excise 
duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages (OJ n° L 316, 31/10/92, p. 21) 
- Council Directive 92/84/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of the rates of excise duty on 
alcohol and ~lcoholic beverages (OJ no L 316, 31/10/92, p. 29) 6 
choice  was  also  introduced,  by  way  of  abolition  of  the  limited  travellers' 
~lowances.  Various ·~hing  problems with the new system have been dealt with 
in two "simplification" directives adopted by the Council. 5 
5  Council Directive 92/108/EEC of 14 December 1992 amending Directive 92/12/EEC (OJ n°
0L 390, 
31/12/92, p 124} 
Council Directive  94174/EEC (OJ n°
0  L 36S ofJI/12/94, p.
046) 7 
2.  SCOPE OF THE REVIEW 
a)  The legislative requirements 
2.1  The various directives concerning  the  approximation  of rates each  require  that, 
every  two  years,  Council  shall  examine  the  rates  of duty  laid  down  in  those 
directives  and,  acting  unanimously  after  consulting  the  European  Parliament, 
shall adopt the necessary measures.  In its examination,  the Council must act on 
the basis of a report and,  where appropriate,  a proposal from  the  Commission. 
The report should take into account the proper functioning of the internal market, 
the  real  value of the  rates  of duty  and  the  wider objectives of the Treaty.  In 
addition,  the  directive  on  alcohol  rates  requires  that  account  be  taken  of 
competition between the different categories of alcoholic beverages. 
2.2  Whilst  the  various  issues  to  be  considered  in  the  review  appear  diverse, 
nonetheless,  there  is  considerable  interaction  between  them.  This  becomes 
evident in the course of the analysis of those issues,  where recurring observations 
arise.  The  various  areas  are  considered  at  a  general  level  in  the  following 
paragraphs,  and  more specifically in  the sections  of the  report dealing  with  the 
different product groups. 
b)  Operation of the Internal Market 
2.3  This topic can be examined at two different levels.  Firstly,  there is the issue of 
the effect, if any,  which  the removal of frontier controls and  the introduction of 
the minimum rates have in  terms of trade movement between Member States for 
any given product.  This can largely be assessed in  terms of the operation of the 
rules on holding and  movement of excisable goods,  combined with  the effect of 
the  actual  duty  rates  applied  in  the  Member  States.  The  second  issue  is  the 
impact of these factors in terms of possible shifts in purchasing patterns from one 
product to another competing product within the same broad product group, both 
within and between Member States.  In this case, wider Treaty objectives can also 
have a major influence on the relationships between products. 
b.l)  Individual product level 
2.4  As regards operation on an individual product level, three types of transaction can 
arise.  These are the commercial movement of duty-suspended goods, commercial 
transactions of duty-paid goods, and purchases by private individuals. 
Commercial movements of  goods under suspension arrangements 
2.5  Directive  92/12/EEC  introduced  a  movement  system  for  intra-Community 
transactions  involving  goods  subject  to  excise  duty.  This  system  allowed  the 
continuation  of a  destination-based  tax  system  which  is  compatible  with  the 
abolition  of frontier  controls.  On  the  whole,  it  would  appear  that,  as  far  as 
legitimate trade is concerned, this system operates relatively well despite the large 
differences in excise duty rates which  still exist between  Member States.  Since 
goods move under duty suspension, whereby duty is payable in  the Member State 8 
of destination, and at the rates applicable in that Member State, it is unlikely that 
.rate differences lead to  any significant distortion of choice or competition on  the 
part of companies involved in trade at this level of the distribution chain. 
2.6  However, it is more difficult to assess the effect which the continued disparity in 
rates  combined  with  the  disappearance  of frontier  controls  has  on  fraudulent 
activity in  this area.  Evidence available to the Commission from  both trade and 
government  sources  does  not  indicate  that,  as  yet,  there  has  been  significant 
increase in  such  fraud.  This is  not  to  say  that fraud  does  not exist within  the 
excise  system:  however,  it is  too  early  to  know  whether  such  fraud  is  on  the 
increase.  Excise rate levels,  and  the consequent perceived  levels of revenue at 
risk, are important factors influencing control policy and,  in  particular, allocation 
of resources  in  Member States.  It remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  levels  and 
nature  of  national  control  measures  and  administrative  cooperation  between 
Member  States  will  be  adequate  to  prevent  widespread  fraud,  and  the 
Commission will continue to monitor this situation closely. 
Commercial activities involving duty-paid goods 
2. 7  Only  a very small  percentage of intra-Community commercial  transactions take 
place outside the suspension  arrangements.  However,  in  some sectors  (notably 
the  wine  trade)  there  is  a  small  but  nonetheless  significant  trade  in  goods 
dispatched direct to  final  consumers (known as distance selling).  In  such cases, 
duty  is  chargeable  in  the country  of destination  and  the  general  procedures  to 
enable such trade to take place are laid down in Directive 92/12/EEC.  However, 
the detailed implementation of some of these procedures is left to Member States, 
and it appears that many operators involved  in  distance selling,  especially small-
and  medium-sized  firms,  are finding  it  difficult  to  accomplish  the  diverse and 
complex  formalities  required  by  the  Member  States,  particularly  where  tax 
representatives  are  involved.  These  aspects  have  already  been  identified  as  a 
cause for concern in a document presented to the Council in  19936• 
2.8  The non-approximation  of duty  rates  appears  to  be  one of the  reasons  for  the 
problems  which  have  occurred  in  respect  of distance  selling  arrangements  and 
other commercial movements of goods outside the suspension arrangements since 
1 January  1993.  This  means  that  the  authorities  in  higher-taxing  countries are 
unable  to  rely  upon  the  self-policing  mechanism  provided  for  in  Directive 
92/12/EEC whereby the reimbursement of duty paid in  the country of dispatch is 
conditional upon proof of payment in the country of destination. 
2.9  There is some evidence that this lack of a self-policing mechanism combined with 
the complexities of national procedures is  tempting otherwise honest traders into 
trading  illegally.  This  implies  that  there should  be  a  greater approximation  of 
rates  and/or  a  simplification  of procedures  if the  principle  of taxation  in  the 
country of destination is to be maintained for distance sales. 
6  SEC(93) 2044,  14 December 1993 9 
Purchases by private individuals 
2.10  The Commission engaged a firm of consultants to study changes in  cross-border 
shopping  patterns  since  1 January  1993.7  The consultants  reported  that  cross-
border shopping was widespread prior to  the introduction of the Internal Market 
and this continues to  be the case.  They also reported that tax differences were, 
and  remain,  one of the major factors giving rise to  such cross-border shopping. 
(The most significant changes which  have occurred since  1 January  1993  are the 
increases  in  quantities  of beer,  wine and  hand-rolling  tobacco  which  are being 
purchased by UK consumers in Belgium and France.) 
2.11  Clearly,  under  the  border-control  system  applying  prior  to  1 January  1993, 
control  was  applied  more  easily  to  sea-crossing  traffic  than  at  land  frontiers. 
Hence,  given  the  wide  rate  differences,  it  is  not  surprising  that  there  was  a 
marked  increase in  purchases of excisable goods in other Member States by  UK 
residents  following  removal  of  frontier  controls  and  the  abolition  of  the 
restrictions on the quantities of duty-paid products which consumers may  buy in 
other  Member  States.  Whilst  most  of  this  increased  activity  is  perfectly 
legitimate  under  the  new  rules,  and  indeed  is  a  positive  consequence  of the 
creation  of the  Internal  Market,  it  is  clear  that  some  of the  products  being 
purchased by  UK  customers are,  in  fact,  being  resold,  illegally,  in  the UK.  A 
similar problem appears to be emerging in Ireland. 
2.12  Member States  which  experience  large-scale  tax-induced  cross-border  shopping 
appear to  recognise that the only  way  to  reduce  such  tax-induced  distortions of 
competition  is  by  narrowing  the  differences  between  their respective duty rates. 
However, the completion of the Internal Market has given rise to very little actual 
approximation  of duty  rates  between  neighbouring  Member States.  The major 
exception is  the case of Denmark where significant reductions in  the excise duty 
applied  to  beer and  wine  were  made  prior to  1 January  1993,  to  bring Danish 
rates  closer  to  those  applied  in  Germany.  The  result  has  been  a  dramatic 
reduction  in  the  level  of cross-border  purchases  of these  products  by  Danish 
consumers. 
b.2)  Product group level 
2.13  Turning  to  the  functioning  of the  Internal  Market  within  product groups,  it  is 
'  more  difficult  to  get  a  clear  assessment  of  the  situation.  There  are  many 
diverging  views  as  to  what  constitutes  a  valid  set  of competitive  relationships 
between individual products within ::t product group.  The factors which influence 
consumer  choice  are  widespread,  and  include  fiscal  policy.  The  express 
requirement to consider competition between the different categories of alcoholic 
beverages is  evidence in  itself of the  importance of this  aspect in  the context of 
the  excise  rates  review,  though  it  is  fair  to  expect  that  it  would  have  been 
considered in  any event, insofar as  it is an  important aspect of the functioning of 
the Internal Market, which must be considered in the review. 
7  "VAT and Excise Duties: Changes in Cross-Border Purchasing Patterns Following the Abolition of 
Fiscal Frontiers on I January 1993", prepared by Price Waterhouse for the European Commission 
(DG XXI), September 1994 10 
2.14  It would seem reasonable to take the current competitive situation within product 
groups  as  an  appropriate  starting  point.  Thus,  from  the  Internal  Market 
viewpoint, the focus should be on whether anything has happened,  or is likely to 
happen,  which  might  (arbitrarily)  produce  distortions  in  the  competitive 
relationships  which  have existed  during  the  first  two  years  of operation  of the 
Internal Market.  What those actual  relationships  should  be,  and  the  extent,  if 
any,  to  which they should be influenced by  fiscal  measures at Community level, 
is largely a matter for consideration under Wider Treaty objectives. 
2.15  As  regards  the  existing  relationships,  one  major  factor  emerges  which  shows 
marked differences between product groups.  In some cases (tobacco products and 
motor fuels)  all competing products are subject to excise duty,  whereas in  others 
(alcoholic beverages and heating fuels)  some potentially competing products are 
either subject to  a  minimum rate of zero (wine)  or are outside the scope of the 
duty altogether (natural gas, coal).  In  these circumstances,  whilst not  making a 
judgement as  to  what  the  competitive  relationships  within  the  various  groups 
should be, it is  nonetheless apparent that adjustment of positive minimum  rates, 
without corresponding action on products which are not subject to positive rates, 
could produce competitive distortions. 
c)  Real value of the rates of duty 
2.16  One of the other main  elements  to  be considered,  as  identified  in  the  relevant 
articles of the directives, is the real value of the rates of duty.  This implies that 
account should be taken of the actual rate changes applied by Member States, and 
in particular the extent to which inflation is  reflected in  those changes.  Inflation 
would normally be taken into account by national administrations when preparing 
the  their budgetary plans.  It would  seem  reasonable  to  assume  that,  all  other 
things  being  equal,  the  rates  applied  by  Member  States  generally  would  be 
increased to take account of inflation. 
2.17  An analysis of the actual rate evolution in Member States shows some interesting 
results.  Firstly,  it is clear that,  for all  products,  there has  been  very little real 
approximation of rates:  Furthermore, even where there has been some degree of 
approximation, the magnitude of the differences in  rates between high taxing and 
low taxing Member States is still extremely large, particularly as when compared 
with the minimum rates themselves.  Annex C contains details of the evolution of 
rates  imposed  by  twelve  Member  States  since  1990  on  the  main  excisable 
products.  Annex D  shows  the  extent of change  in  those  Member States'  rates 
since January 1993, in both national rates 'and ecus.  Annex E shows the extent of 
change in national currency vis-a-vis the ecu since October 1992. 
2.18  Equally interesting is the fact  that,  in  some product groups,  notably motor fuels, 
very large real increases, often well in  excess of inflation,  have been applied by 
Member States.  However, for other groups, particularly alcoholic beverages and, 
to  a lesser extent,  heating  fuels,. there has  been  a  marked  stagnation of national 
rates.  Such  stagnation has meant that even  inflation-linked adjustments have not 
been applied to these products in several Member States. 11 
2.19  The Commission  notes  that  this  latter  phenomenon  is  most  marked  in·  sectors 
where certain products need not be subject to excise duty either because they are · 
subject to a  minimum  rate of zero or because they  are outside the scope of the 
duty, whilst other, potentially competing products, are subject to taxation.  Thus, 
it has  become  clear  that  in  some  areas,  Member  States  have been  ready  and 
willing  to  increase the real  value of their national  rates  whereas  in  other areas 
there  has  been  a  general  tendency  to  allow  a  decrease  in  real  values  by  not 
increasing national rates.  Either way, with the exception of tobacco duties (which 
include ad valorem elements) there has been very little straightforward "tracking" 
of inflation rates. 
2.20  According  to  the Eurostat Consumer Price Indices,  the rate of inflation in  1993 
was 3.4%, whilst the figure for 1994 was 3.1 %,  giving a cumulative total for the 
two  year  period  (1993-1994)  of 6.6%.  Details  of National  Consumer  Price  · 
Indices are contained in Annex F. 
d)  Wider Treaty aspects 
2.21  Two  general  issues  which  apply  to  all  categories  of  excise  products  are 
particularly relevant at present.  Firstly, the Commission White paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and  Employment identifies increases in  the~  of excise duties 
on  all product groups as  a means  of funding  reductions in  statutory charges on 
labour (in addition to assisting in other policy areas).  In the same way, the White 
Paper suggests extending the ~  of the existing duty on mineral oils. 
2.22  Secondly, given the conditions to be fulfilled by Member States in  the context of 
European  Monetary  Union,  it is  important  that  the  Community's  ~xcise policy 
should  be  consistent  with  ensuring  sufficient  revenue  receipts  and  sound 
economies at national level as well as with overall European Union policies. 
2.23  Besides these general issues,  there are a number of more specific policy aspects 
which  can  be  of varying  relevance  for  the  different  excise  product  groups. 
Furthermore, such policies do not always pull in  the same direction,  in  terms of 
their interconnection with excise policy.  For mineral oils, the main  concerns are 
in  the  energy,  transport,  environment  and  industry  areas.  For  alcohol  and 
tobacco  products,  the  main  preoccupations  are  health  and  agriculture.  These 
aspects are considered in  detail in  the relevant sections of this report.  It is .clear 
that  reconciling  the  various  Treaty  objectives  with  improvements  in  the 
functioning  of the internal market raises potentially difficult issues which  cannot 
always be resolved easily. 
e)  Need for further measures 
2.24  There still appears to be general agreement amongst Member States on  the need 
for  further  rate  approximation.  Traders,  too,  argue  that  greater  rate 
approximation  would  help  them  to  operate within  the Internal Market.  What  is 
less  clear,  however,  is  the level  or degree  to  which  rate  approximation  should 
take  place,  and  there  has  been  little  evidence  of that  approximation  over  the 
review period.  It is probably fair to say that each Member State would wish  that 12 
other Member States should adjust their rates to bring them  in  line with its own 
national rates. 
2. 25  It is already clear from the operation of the system over the past two years,  and 
indeed in  the light of the evolution  of that system's  intr~uction, that  there  is 
much  room  for  development  of a  coherent  Community  excise  policy  for  the 
future which,  on the one hand,  recognises  the  role of excise duties as  national 
revenue earners,  but on  the other hand  takes  full  account of the  needs  of the 
Internal Market and the wider objectives of the Treaty.  Furthermore, the analysis 
in the preceding paragraphs shows that the range of relevant issues, and the actual 
practice in Member States, can vary significantly between product groups.  It also 
shows that certain aspects of the excise system are obstructing the process of rate 
approximation. 
2.26  The  Commission  is  of  the  view  that  detailed  consultation  with  national 
administrations  and  with  trade  and  other interest  groups  is  necessary  to  allow 
more detailed analysis of all the relevant issues and  the implications of possible 
consequent adjustments to the excise system.  Thus,  this report confines itself to 
analysis  of the  experience  to  date  and,  where  appropriate,  a  highlighting  of 
potential problem areas, without putting forward specific proposals at this stage. 13 
3.  CIGARETIES 
a)  Review requirements 
3.1  Article 4 of Directive 92179/EEC states: 
"Every  two  years  and for the first time  not later than  31  December  1994,  the 
Council,  acting on the basis of  a report and,  where appropriate,  a proposal from 
the  Commission,  shall  examine  the  overall minimum  excise  duty  laid  down  in 
Anicle 2,  the  provisions  of Anicle 3(2)  and  the  structure  of excise  duties  as 
defined  in  Anide JOb  of Directive  721464/EEC  and,  acting  unanimously  after 
consulting  the  European  Parliament,  shall adopt the  necessary measures.  The 
repon by  the  Commission  and  the  examination  by  the  Council  shall take  into 
account the proper functioning of  the internal market and the  wider objectives of 
the Treaty. " 
(Article 3(2) concerns a Portuguese derogation for certain cigarettes consumed in 
the Azores and Madeira). 
b)  Duty structure 
3.2  Under Article lOb of Directive 72/464/EEC (as amended)8,  each Member State's 
excise  duty  on  cigarettes  must  consist  of two  parts,  one  ad  valorem  and  one 
specific,  with the specific element representing between 5%  and 55%  of the total 
tax  burden  (excise  duty  plus  VAT)  of the  most  popular  price  category  of 
cigarettes sold in that Member State.  Once these two parts have been established 
for  this  category  of  cigarettes,  they  are  applied  to  cigarettes  of  all  price 
categories. 
3.3  The relationship between the specific and ad valorem elements of the excise duty 
has been the subject of protracted debate over many years.  Some Member States 
apply the minimum specific element,  whereas others choose the maximum,  with 
corresponding effects on  the ad valorem elements of the duty.  This contributes to 
the differences in  retail prices.  Notwithstanding that the Council has not agreed 
the final  stage of harmonisation of the structure of excise duty on cigarettes, there 
is  no  evidence to  suggest that any proposed change in  the ratio of specific to  ad 
valorem  excise would  be agreed  at  the  current  time.  Nor does  such  a  c~ange 
appear  to  be  essential  at  present  in  order  to  improve  the  functioning  of the 
Internal Market. 
3.4  Consequently,  this  report  does  not  propose  to  analyse  the  exzstmg  balance 
between  specific  and  ad  valorem  excise  duty,  as  defined  in  Article  lOb  of 
Directive 72/464/EEC.  However, this is an  issue which would merit examination 
in the course of the proposed consultation procedure. 
8  Council Directive 72/464/EEC on taxes other than turnover taxes which aiTect the consumption of 
manufactured tobacco, OJ ll
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Real value of the rates of duty 
The minimum rate of exCise duty on cigarettes is set at 57%  of the retail selling 
priCe (inclusive of all taxes) for cigarettes of the price category most in demand in 
each· Member State (based on data established as at 1 January,  each  year).  The 
fact  that this  minirrtum  rate  is  expressed  as  a  percentage of retail  selling  price 
means that it automatically takes account of inflation,  and  thus does not require 
adjustment in this context. 
The Commission notes that certain Member States have had  to  increase their tax 
levels  substantially  in  order  to  comply  with  this  minimum  rate.  It is  also 
appropriate to note here that the transitional period granted to Spain to achieve a 
minimum rate of 57% ended on 31  December 1994. 
Functioning of the Internal Market 
High levels of  fraud involving cigarettes have been reported in recent years.  It has 
been noted, however, that the main source of  this fraud has not been related directly 
to either the excise duty control system or the abolition of frontier controls in  the 
Internal  Market.  Rather,  it  has  been associated with  a lack of rigour  in  Member 
States' application of the customs rules at the Union's external frontiers,  and with 
difficulties in the functioning of the customs transit arrangements.  In  this context, 
the Commission has focussed attention on these problems in a Communication dated 
29  March  19959.  In  view  of the  Community  own  resources  implications,  the 
Commission has taken concrete steps towards tightening up transit rules,  has set up 
a Task Force to combat fraud  in the cigarette sector and  continues to monitor the 
situation closely. 
The rates of duty applied by Member States to cigarettes are shown in  Annex  G. 
The apparent approximation of rates,  when incidence is  expressed  in  percentage 
terms,  is deceptive, as very real differences still exist in  the actual levels of duty 
applied to a given quantity of cigarettes.  This is  because of the combination of 
very wide differences in the pre-tax prices of cigarettes and widely varying levels 
of specific and ad valorem taxation. 
Given  the  position  outlined above regarding  the duty  structure,  the  Commission 
does  not consider it appropriate,  at this  stage,  to bring forward  measures aimed 
specifically at further rate approximation.  At the same time, however, it has been 
noted that the existing rules, far from producing further rate approximation, could 
actually  lead  to increased  rate divergence.  The Commission  considers  that  this 
could  be  contrary  to  development  of the  Internal  Market  and  an  issue  which 
warrants examination. 
The retail price of cigarettes is made up  of a number of elements such as  the ex-
factory  cost,  the  distributors'  margins,  the  excise  duty  (specific  element),  the 
excise duty (ad  valorem element),  and  value added  tax.  Since the  incidence of 
the overall minimum excise duty is calculated as a percentage of the final  selling 
price of cigarettes of the most popular price category,  it follows  that changes in 
Communication from the Commission:  Fraud in the Transit procedure, solutions foreseen and 
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any  single  price component disturb  the  relationship  between  the  overall  excise 
duty and the retail selling price. 
3.11  This is a  real issue in  Member States  where tax  levels are at or just above·  the 
57%  minimum rate.  An  increase in the ex-factory cost, for instance, can lead to 
an  increase in retail price which would result in the overall excise falling below 
the 57%  minimum.  This then  requires the Member State concerned to increase 
its excise duty in order to once again respect the 57%  minimum. 
3.12  A number of Member States which already apply high  tax  policies in  respect of 
cigarettes  are  nonetheless  at  or  close  to  the  57%  threshold  (e.g.  Belgium, 
Germany,  France, Ireland,  the Netherlands,  Austria and  Finland).  It is difficult 
to accept that forced duty increases in countries with already high ~  burdens was 
Council's deliberate intention as it is clearly at odds with an overall commitment 
to  rate approximation,  however  gradual.  Such  an  outcome  would,  over time, 
stimulate growing divergence of tax burdens in the Community (measured in cash 
terms), which in turn would lead to greater tax-driven differences in retail prices. 
The Commission  does  not  consider  that  such  effects  are in  the  interest of the 
Internal Market. 
3.13  The only viable means of addressing such a problem would appear to be to allow 
Member  States  the option  to  refrain  from  making  upward  adjustments  to  their 
duty levels when there is an  increase in  the non-duty elements of the retail price, 
even  if  that  were  to  mean  that  the  overall  duty  incidence,  expressed  as  a 
percentage  of retail  price,  would  fall  below  57%.  There  would  be no  need, 
however,  to  vary  the  requirement  in  Member States  to  continue  to  respect  the 
underlying rules  regarding composition of  the excise duty  (i.e.  the duty must be 
composed  of both  an  ad  valorem  and  specific  element,  and  the  latter  must 
represent between 5%  and 55%  of the total tax  burden for cigarettes of the most 
popular price category).  Such an option could be limited to those Member States 
which,  in  absolute terms,  apply relatively high  levels of duty,  in the interests of 
preventing further divergence. 
3.14  Given that this is a potential problem in  the context of overall rate approximation, 
the  Commission  will  continue  to  monitor  the  situation  and  will,  if necessary, 
bring forward a proposal to address it. 
e)  Wider Treaty objectives  ' 
3.15  The main  issue for cigarettes under this heading is health protection, particularly 
in the context of Article 3(o) of the Treaty ("the Community shall contribute to 
the  attainment  of a  high-level  of health  protection")  and  Article  129  ("health 
protection  requirements shall  form  a constituent part of the Community's other 
policies").  Over half a million people in  the European Union died in  1994 from 
tobacco-related  diseases.  Moreover,  tobacco-related  morbidity  greatly  adds  to 
health-care costs.  Taxation of tobacco products is an  obvious means not only of 
discouraging  tobacco  consumption,  but  also  of providing  a  contribution  to  the 
funding  of consequent  health-care  costs.  The  recent  communication  from  the 
Commission concerning the fight against cancer in  the context of the framework 16 
for action  in  the field of public health10  states that  "an  upward harmonisation of 
tobacco prices across  the  Community"  is  among  the actions  which  need  to  be 
continued and developed.· 
3.16  This· report is also required to examine the provisions of Article 3(2) of Directive 
92179/EEC.  These allow Portugal to apply a reduced rate, of up to 50% less than 
the normal minimum rate,' in the case of cigarettes consumed in  the Azores and 
Madeira and made by small-scale producers. 
3.17  This reduced  rate is ia accordance with a declaration  annexed  to  the Maastricht 
Treaty11  which allows specific measures to be adopted to assist remote regions of 
the Community.  In addition,  it is  compatible with  the  POSEIMA programme, 
which specifically allows certain favourable taxation arrangements for the Azores 
an~ Madeira.  Finally,  no  particular problems relating  to  fraud  or distortion  of 
competition, arising from .the current arrangements, have been reported. 
0  Conclusions 
3.18  The  Commission  concludes  that  the  duty  structure  for  cigarettes  should  be 
examined further in the course of the consultation process referred to earlier.  It 
also intends to pay close attention to the operation of the 57%  rule in high-taxing 
Member States, and will bring forward an appropriate proposal if this is found to 
be interfering with the process of rate approximation. 
10  Annex to COM(94) 83 Final 
11  Annex to Treaty on European Union ·Declaration (N° 26) on the outermost regions of the Community 17 
4.  OTHER MANQFACTIJRED TOBACCO 
a)  Review requirements 
4.1  Article 4 of Directive 92/80/EEC states: 
"Every  two  years  and for the first  time  not  later  than  31 December  1994,  the 
Council,  acting on the basis of  a report and,  where appropriate,  a proposal from 
the  Commission,  shall examine  the  rates  of duty laid down  herein  and,  acting 
unanimously after consulting the European Parliament,  shall adopt the necessary 
measures.  The  report by  the  Commission  and the  examination  by the  Council 
shall  take  into  account the proper functioning  of the  internal market,  the  real 
value of  the rates of  duty and the wider objectives of  the Treaty. " 
4.2  The  existing  minimum  rates  of excise  duty  for  tobacco  products  other  than 
cigarettes are laid  down  in  Article  3  of Directive 92/80/EEC.  Member States 
may apply either an  ad  valorem duty based on  the maximum retail selling price, 
or a specific duty, or a mixture of both, subject to certain specified limits. 
b)  Real value of the rates of duty 
4.3  The minimum rates of duty laid down in Article 3 of Directive 92/80/EEC are: 
Cigars and cigarillos:  5%  of the  retail  selling  price  or ECU  7  per  1,000 
items or per kilogram; 
Hand-rolling tobacco:  30%  of  the  retail  selling  price  or  ECU  20  per 
kilogram; 
Other smoking tobacco:  20%  of  the  retail  selling  price  or  ECU  15  per 
kilogram· 
4.4  As  indicated above, the minimum  rates  for these products are expressed both  in 
terms  of  a  percentage  of  retail  price  and  as  a  specific  amount.  All  other 
considerations aside,  it is  noted  that,  over time and  with  inflationary growth,  a 
gap  will  open  up  betw~n  these  two  factors,  with  the  ad  valorem  rate 
automatically  tracking  changes  in  retail  prices.  Accordingly,  inflation-based 
adjustment  of  the  minimum  rates  expressed  as  specific  amounts  would  be 
necessary  to  maintain  the  relationships  established  when  the  rates  were  set 
originally.  However,  before making  proposals in  this  respect,  the Commission 
considers that the question  of the  role of minimum  rates should be examined in 
the proposed consultation process. 
4.5  As  regards  actual  rate  evolution,  most  Member  States  apply  rates  which  rely 
heavily, if not exclusively, on an  ad  valorem element, thus ensuring that account 
is  taken  of inflation  more  or less  automatically.  Furthermore,  those  Member 
States who apply specific taxation have tended  to  adjust their duty levels in  this 
regard. 
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c)  Functioning of the Internal Market 
4.6  The United  Kingdom  and  Ireland  have experienced  significant increases  in  the 
quantities of hand-rolled tobacco being brought back from  other Member States 
(typically Belgium and the Netherlands) and ultimately being  resold illegally on 
their  domestic  markets.  This  occurs  because  the  difference  in  retail  prices 
between the UK and Ireland on the one hand and their near neighbouring Member 
States  is  such  that duty-paid  products  can  be purchased  in  those  neighbouring 
Member States and resold at a price well below the normal (duty-inclusive) retail 
price in  the  UK and  Ireland.  In  the  UK alone,  these  illegal  sales  have been 
estimated to account for around 5% of the total sales of hand-rolling tobacco. 
4.  7  Differing tax levels is one of the factors behind this trend.  It is also noteworthy, 
however,  that  there  are  large differences  in  the  pre-tax  prices  of comparable 
hand-rolled tobacco products in  the various Member States,  with  such  prices in 
Ireland  and  the  United  Kingdom  being  more  than  twice  as  high  as  in,  say, 
Belgium or the Netherlands. 
4.8  To the extent that this  situation is  giving  rise to  considerable fraud,  it  must be 
noted that its cause - and any potential solution - does not lie exclusively in  the 
taxation  domain.  Indeed,  any  proposal  to  address  this  situation  solely  by 
adjustment  of the  minimum  rate  would  require  so  large  an  increase  as  to  be 
unrealistic.  It would clearly be unacceptable to  most Member States and in any 
event  would  cause  major  distortion  of  the  balance  between  consumption  of 
cigarettes and consumption of hand-rolled tobacco. 
4.9  At face value, therefore, it would appear that this is essentially a matter for high 
taxing  Member  States  to  tackle,  through  reducing  their  national  rates  and/or 
improved control measures. 
4.10  No  major  Internal  Market  problems  have  been  reported  for  the  other 
manufactured tobacco products, either in the context of cross-border shopping or 
large scale fraud.  Furthermore,  no  particular concerns have been expressed by 
the relevant trade bodies.  Finally, it is noted that there is very little demand/price 
cross elasticity between these products and other tobacco products. 
d)  Wider Treaty objectives 
4.11  As  for  cigarettes,  the  most  significant aspect of wider Community  policies  for 
other tobacco products is health protection.  The risk to health from use of hand-
rolled tobacco in particular gives serious cause for concern.  The lower price of 
such  tobacco  makes  it  an  attractive  alternative  to  manufactured  cigarettes 
especially for young people.  The absence of measured amounts of nicotine and 
tar for hand-rolled cigarettes and in  many cases of a  filter,  are factors which can 
increase the risk of consuming such tobacco. 
4.12  On  the other hand,  adjustment of the  minimum  rate for  hand-rolling tobacco  in 
isolation  could  have  implications  for  the  competitive  relationship  between  that 
product and cigarettes, and for associated employment levels. 19 
4.13  The  cigar  and  cigarillo  sector  is  different  from  the  cigarette  and  hand-rolled 
tobacco sectors.  It essentially consists of small-scale artisanal production,  often 
in rural areas and with low skill,  high  labour content.  It covers a wide range of 
products,  catering  for  a variety of tastes  and  price ranges,  but has  recorded  a 
significant  decline  in  consumption  levels  in  recent  years.  Pipe  tobacco  also 
accounts for a very marginal part of tobacco consumption generally. It is a sector 
which is somewhat stagnant, and in fact is in decline in some Member States. 
e)  Conclusions 
4.14  The Commission believes that,  in  the course of the consultation process,  further 
consideration  should  be  given  to  the  appropriate  taxation  approach  for  hand-
rolling  tobacco  in  the  light of the  health  and  competition  concerns  highlighted 
above.  Attention should also be paid  to  the appropriate relationship between ad 
valorem and specific rates, when minima are expressed in both terms. 20 
5.  ALcQBOL AND AI£0HQUC BEYEBAGES · 
a)  Review requirements 
5.1  Article 8 of Directive 92/84/EEC states that: 
"Every  two years  and for the first  time  not  later than  31 December  1994,  the 
Council,  acting on the basis of  a report and,  where appropriate,  a proposal from 
the  Commission,  shall  examine  the  rates  of duty  laid  down  herein  and,  acting 
unanimously qfter consulting the European  Parliament,  shall adopt the necessary 
measures.  The  report by  the  Commission  and  the  consideration  by the  Council 
shall take into account the proper functioning of  the internal market,  competition 
between the different categories of  alcoholic drinks,  the  real value of  the rates of 
duty and the wider objectives of  the Treaty." 
5.2  It was  agreed during  the  negotiations  on  Directive 92/84/EEC,  to  examine the 
possibility of introducing a control levy for wine.  Furthermore, in an  agreement 
between UK and Spain on intermediate products,  which is  annexed  to  Directive 
92/83/EEC, the Commission is recorded as  saying  special attention will  be paid 
to these products under the review procedure.  Both of these items are considered 
below. 
b)  Real value of the rates of duty 
5.3  The minimum rates of duty for alcohol and alcoholic beverages are laid down  in 
Directive 92/84/EEC as follows: 
Wine 
Beer 
Intermediate products: 
Spirits  · 
ECUO 
ECU 0. 748 per hectolitre/degree p~ato 
or ECU 1.87 per hectolitre/degree plato 
of alcohol of finished product 
ECU 45 per hectolitre of product 
ECU 550 per hectolitre of pure alcohol 
(if below ECU 1  ,000, cannot reduce, 
(Article 5) 
(Article 6) 
(Article 4) 
(Article 3) 
if above ECU 1  ,000, cannot go below ECU 1  ,000) 
5.4  It is noted that, in  several relatively low-taxing Member States, particularly those 
which apply a zero rate to wine,  the rates on alcoholic beverages generally have 
not been  increased,  and  in  some  cases  have reduced  in  real  terms.  Similarly, 
higher taxing Member States who also tax wine, but whose neighbouring Member 
States apply a zero rate, have also not increased their rates of excise on alcoholic 
drinks.  In  this context,  it is  significant  that  Austria,  whose neighbours apply a 
zero rate to wine, reduced its wine excise to zero on joining the European Union. 
In  general,  there  has  been  a  marked  stagnation  in  the  rates  of duty  applied  to 
alcoholic drinks.  This  would  suggest  that  the  zero  rate  for  wine can  limit  the 
scope  for  rate adjustments  on  other alcohol  products  within  the  same  Member 
State, and on all alcohol products in neighbouring Member States. 21 
c)  Competition between alcoholic drink categories 
5.5  In  addition  to  the  issues  covered  in  the  review  of the  rates  applied  to  other 
excisable  products,  Article  8  of Directive  92/84/EEC  introduces  the  express 
obligation  to  consider  compaition  between  different  categories  of alcoholic 
drinks.  In  fact,  this  topic  would,  in  any  event,  fall  to  be  considered  in  the 
context of the functioning of the Internal Market.  Given the importance attached 
in the Directive to  this particular issue,  the Commission engaged an  independent 
firm of consultants to assess the extent of such competition. 
5. 6  The consultants found  that there is  indeed competition between alcoholic drinks 
categories.  They concluded that "excise duty affects consumption of the different 
alcoholic beverages through  their sensitivity to  their specific price"  and  "excise 
duty can also affect the market shares of different categories of alcoholic beverage 
because of competition through prices". 
5. 7  Whilst there are many different views on the degree of competition between wine 
and  other alcoholic  beverages,  it  would  seem  that  it  is  not  disputed  that  that 
competition  does  exist  in  at  least  some  Member  States,  and  for  a  sizeable 
percentage of inhabitants of the European Union.  Furthermore, the EC  Court of 
Justice, in case 170/78, found that beer was in competition with wine. 
5. 8  However, provided that they do not breach the requirements of Article 95  of the 
Treaty and they respect the minimum rates,  Member States are free,  in principle, 
to decide on the extent to which they wish to take this into account in  setting their 
national rates. 
5.9  Nevertheless, as indicated above, high-taxing Member States will increasingly be 
constrained in  this  freedom  by the need  to  take account of rates applying to  the 
same  or  equivalent  products  in  other  Member  States.  This  complication  is 
exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  the  competitive  relationships  between  different 
alcoholic  beverages  vary  significantly  from  one  Member  State  to  another, 
depending on factors such as taste, climate, tradition, etc. 
5.10  Thus,  whilst it is  relatively easy  to  establish  that,  in  general  terms,  competition 
between drinks categories exists,  it is  more difficult  to  conclude as  to  how  that 
competition factor should best be reflected in  the Community's excise policy,  or 
indeed  whether such  a policy  can  be developed  to  address  the  widely  differing 
situations in  the Member States.  On  the other hand, the continued existence of a 
zero rate for one alcoholic beverage means that adjustment of the minimum rates 
for other alcoholic beverages alone could induce competitive distortion. 
d)  Other aspects of the functioning of the Internal Market 
5.11  In  paragraph  (ii)  of the  Agreement  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  Spain, 
which  is annexed  to  Directive 92/83/EEC on  the  harmonisation  of structures of 
excise duties on alcohol and alcoholic beverages, the Commission states that:  "in 
the context of the regular reports foreseen in Article 8 of the Council Directive on 
the approximation of the rates of duty on alcohol and alcoholic beverages,  it will 
pay  special  attention  to  the  rates  applied  to  these  products  [i.e.  intermediate 22 
products of a strength exceeding  15%  abv and intermediate products of a strength 
not exceeding  15%  abv]  in  order to  take into account, in  particular,  the problem 
of competition between the various categories of drinks concerned." 
5.12  The ·existing  arrangements  regarding  intermediate  products,  as  laid  down  in 
Article  18  of Directive  92/83/EEC,  reflect  a  compromise  between  radically 
different situations In  various Member States.  They can result in widely different 
rates of duty applying to broadly similar products, particularly given that different 
· rules  can  apply  to  intermediate  products  of a  strength  which  exceeds  15% 
volume, and those whQse strength does not exceed this level.  However, it is clear 
that  intermediate  products  cannot  be  considered  in  isolation  from  the  overall 
question of competition in the alcoholic dri~ks sector. 
5.13  Thr~  Member States (Denmark,  Ireland and  the United  Kingdom)  have applied 
rates  significantly  above .the  minimum  for  beer  and  wine  since  1993.  The 
differences  between  the  rates  applied  in  these  three  Member  States  and  their 
neighbouring  Member States can  give  rise  to  significant  levels  of cross-border 
purchasing,  as confirmed by the study prepared for  the Commission.  The most 
documented  incidents  relate  to  purchases  in  France by  residents  of the  United 
Kingdom.  Reports have been commissioned by many other bodies, including the 
United  Kingdom authorities and  trade  representative bodies,  which  also  identify 
large-scale cross-border purchases of beer and, to a lesser extent, wine. 
5.14  Whilst the various reports do  not always agree on  the  scale of the phenomenon, 
or on the extent to  which excise rates  influence it,  it is  universally accepted that 
the excise rate differences are a significant factor.  Of course,  it has to be noted 
that  much  of this  phenomenon  is  a  perfectly  reasonable  consequence  of  the 
Internal  Market.  To  the  extent  that  Member  States  are  concerned  about  the 
deflection  of purchases,  significant  scope exists  for  them  to  reduce  the  rate  of 
duty  for beer (and  wine).  This approach  has  already been  adopted  for  beer by 
Denmark,  with  a  consequent  significant  reduction  in  tax-induced  cross-border 
shopping.  In contrast, the French beer rate was increased significantly to comply 
with the current minimum.  Furthermore, the French market has seen a reduction 
in  overall  beer  sales  since  January  1993,  despite  the  increased  volume  of 
purchases there by UK residents. 
5.15  In  addition,  the  Commission  notes  that  the  non-tax  components  of beer  retail 
prices  differ  significantly  between  Member  States  despite  the  fact  that  beer  is 
generally produced in  each  Member State.  Such  differences are questionable in 
the context of a Single Market, and the Commission believes that close scrutiny is 
warranted  in  those  Member  States  where  non-tax  price  components  are 
comparatively high. 
5.16  Although  the  same  three  Member  States  (Denmark,  Ireland  and  the  United 
Kingdom)  apply  rates  well  in  excess  of the  minimum  rate  for  spirits  there  is 
comparatively  little  evidence  of  significant  cross-border  shopping  for  these 
products.  This is  explained  in  the case of Denmark because of the  maintenance 
of quantitative restrictions for  travellers,  and  in  the case of the  UK  and  Ireland 
because  a  large  proportion  of spirits  purchased  by  travellers  returning  to  these 5.17 
5.18 
e) 
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Member States are duty-free purchases  made on  ferries  or planes and  not duty-
paid purchases made in other Member States. 
The rates applied to alcoholic beverages by Sweden and Finland are even higher 
than  those in  Denmark,  Ireland and the UK.  However,  both of these Member 
States  negotiated  derogations  to  allow  them  to  impose  restrictions  on  the 
quantities  of alcoholic  beverages  which  can  be  purchased  abroad  for  personal 
consumption.  It is too early to say what, if any, impact these factors will have on 
the levels of both legal and illegal cross-border trade into Finland and Sweden for 
these products. 
During  the  negotiations  on  Directive 92/84/EEC it  was  agreed  to  examine the 
possibility of introducing a control levy in those cases where, at 1 January 1994, 
a  zero  rate  is  applied  to  certain  excise  products.  In  the  light  of this,  the 
Commission engaged a firm of consultants to examine the merits of a monitoring 
charge from a control viewpoint12 •  The consultants found that control procedures 
were  being  applied  in  the  case  of intra-Community  movements  of zero-rated 
wines.  Such problems as  exist  in  control of such  movements  also  existed  for 
movement of products subject to duty and were unlikely to be reduced, other than 
perhaps  marginally,  by the introduction  of a  monitoring  charge.  Accordingly, 
there would appear to be little merit in the introduction of a monitoring charge for 
the purposes of controlling intra-Community movements. 
Wider Treaty objectives 
The Community wine sector is the subject of reform of its common organisation 
of the market in  the context of the Common Agricultural Policy.  The objective of 
this reform is to get market balance in  a  situation of overproduction with,  at the 
same time, declining consumption, particularly of table wines.  In  this context it 
has  been  argued  that  the  notion  of introducing  a  positive  excise duty  rate  in 
producing Member. States is, at worst,  inappropriate and,  at best,  ill-timed.  On 
the other hand,  introduction of a positive minimum  rate could be beneficial for 
CAP control purposes at national level. 
5.20  From the viewpoint of social and health  policies,  alcohol taxation  is  a potential 
means  of  discouraging  excessive  consumption.  This  can  have  positive 
consequences  in  terms  of  reduced  problems  associated  with  alcoholism  and 
.alcohol abuse.  In contrast, in some Member States, wine is considered a cultural 
product and an integral part of the traditional diet, possibly having positive effect 
on health when consumed in  moderation. 
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Conclusions 
The competitive position  between  different alcoholic  drinks  raises complex  and 
often  emotive  issues.  As  indicated  above,  the  fiscal  treatment  of alcoholic 
beverages generally cannot be divorced from  the treatment of wine.  Moreover, it 
cannot be considered in  isolation from  a  number of other policy considerations. 
The Commission believes therefore that this issue should be examined further in 
"Intra-Community Trade in Zero-rated Products (wine and heating gas oil)", prepared by Van 
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the  course  of  the  proposed  consultation  process.  This  would  mean  that 
. development of a  coherent excise policy  should  follow  expression  of the  views 
and  arguments of all  interested parties.  In  the meantime,  those Member States 
who are at or near the existing minimum may retain their existing rates, and thus 
a,void  any  trade  distortions  which  might  be  brought  about  by  forced  rate 
adjustments. 25 
6.  MINERAL OILS 
a)  Review requirements 
6.1  Article 10 of  Directive 92/82/EEC states: 
HEvery  two  years  and for the first  time  not  later than  31 December  1994,  the 
Council,  acting on the basis of  a report and,  where appropriate,  a proposal from 
the  Commission,  shall  examine  the  rates  of duty  laid  down  herein  and,  acting 
unanimously after consulting the European  Parliament,  shall adopt the necessary 
measures.  The  report  by  the  Commission  and the  examination  by  the  Council 
shall  take  into ·account the  proper functioning  of the  internal  market,  the  real 
value of  the rates of  duty and the wider objectives of  the Treaty. H 
6.2  Article  5  of the  same  directive  requires  the  Commission  to  report  on  the 
effectiveness of  a monitoring charge authorised for heating gas oil in certain Member 
States. Furthermore, At the time the Directive was adopted, it was agreed to review 
the situation regarding transitional rates which Luxembourg was authorised to apply 
until 3 1 December 1994. 
6.3  Arising from decisions taken under the procedure for reduced rates and exemptions 
provided by Article 8(4) ofDirective 92/81/EEC, the Commission is also obliged to 
review  the  taxation of heavy  fuel  oil  with  a  low  sulphur  content,  and  the  relief 
applied by Italy in respect of  mineral oils used for alumina production in Sardinia. 
b)  Real value of the rates of duty 
6.4  The minimum rates of  duty laid down in Directive 92/82/EEC are as follows: 
Petrol (leaded) 
Petrol (unleaded) 
Gas oil 
Propellant 
Art. 8 (3)  uses 
Heatingfitel 
Heavy fuel oil 
ECU 337 per 1,000 litres 
(ECU 292 in Luxembourg, to 31/12/94) 
ECU 287 per 1,000 litres 
(ECU 242 in Luxembourg, to 31/12/94) 
ECU 245 per 1,000 litres 
(ECU 195 in Luxembourg and Greece to 31/12/94) 
ECU 18 per 1,000 litres 
ECU 18 per 1,000 litres 
ECU 13 per 1,000 kg. 
Liquid  petroleum gas and methane 
Propellant  ECU 100 per 1,000 kg 
Art. 8 (3)  uses  ECU 36 per 1,000 kg 
Heatingfitel  ECU 0 per 1,000 kg 
Kerosene 
Propellant 
Art. 8 (3) uses 
Heating fitel 
ECU 245 per 1,000 litres 
ECU 18 per 1,000 litres 
ECU 0 per 1,000 litres 
(Article 3) 
(Article 4) 
(Article 5) 
(Article 6) 
(Article 7) 
(Article 8) 26 
6.5  The national  rates of excise  duty  on  mineral  oils  used  as  motor fuels  have  been 
increased by large amounts in  most Member States, with increases being as high as 
30% in some cases.  Thus, Member States have been happy to apply rate increases 
exceeding inflation levels, with consequent increases in the real impact of  their duties 
on motor fuels.  In fact, for petrol (both leaded and unleaded) even the lowest taxing 
Member States now apply rates exceeding the minimum rates by about 20%.  Whilst 
large increases have also been applied to diesel rates, the gap between the minimum 
and the lowest national rates is somewhat smaller than for petrol.  These large rate 
increases appear to have been poasible due to a combination of  low oil prices (in real 
terms) plus the relatively low price elasticity of motor fuel,  which  has  meant that 
Member  States  have  been  able  to  secure  substantially  increased  revenue  yields 
without any significant reductions in consumption levels. 
6.6  In  contrast,  for heating  fuels  the level  of increase  applied  has  been  much  lower 
generally.  In fact, over half the Member States have not adjusted their rates since 1 
January  1993.  Thus,  for  heating  fuels,  duty levels  and  consequent  receipts  have 
stagnated and,  in  some  cases,  reduced,  in  real  terms.  One  possible  explanatory 
factor  for  this  phenomenon  would  appear  to  be  the  fact  that  certain  directly 
competing  products,  notably  natural  gas  and  coal,  are  outside  the  scope  of the 
Community excise duty and that, in this sector, Member States have been somewhat 
prevented  from  exploiting  the  same  factors  which  have  led  to  increased  revenue 
yields from motor fuels. 
6. 7  Article 5 of Directive 92/82/EEC allows Belgium and  Luxembourg to apply a zero 
rate to heating gas oil,  provided that they levy a monitoring charge of ECU 5 per 
1,000 Iitres.  The Commission  notes that this  generates revenue  receipts  in  those 
Member States, and thus it can, in practice, have the same effect as a tax or duty. 
c)  Functioning of the Internal Market 
6.8  All  motor fuels  are  subject  to --excise  duty,  by  virtue  of Article  2(3)  of Directive 
92/81/EEC which states that "any product intended for use, offered for sale or used 
as  motor fuel........  shall  be  taxed  as  motor fuel."  This,  at  least,  means  that  all 
competing products are within the scope of excise duty, and therefore adjustment of 
minimum rates can take place without automatically creating competitive distortions. 
6. 9  Significant differences exist,  both at minimum rate and national  rate level,  between 
the  treatment  of different  motor fuels.  This  can  lead  to  complaints  from  those 
sectors of  the trade which perceive themselves as unfairly treatt!d.  However, a wide 
range  of policy  objectives  can  be  relev~nt  in  determining  how  the  relative  tax 
burdens of  different motor fuels should be set. 
6.10  Wide rate differences also exist between national rates for each product.  This does 
result in  high levels of cross-border shopping in  some areas,  mainly by  residents of 
border areas and passing motorists (hauliers, tourists etc.).  This would seem to be a 
legitimate consequence of  the internal market.. 
6. 11  It  was  agreed  during  the  negotiations  on  Directive  92/82/EEC  that  the 
Commission should  review  the situation  regarding  the rates  in  Luxembourg and 
the  neighbouring  countries  at  the  end  of  the  transitional  period,  taking  into 
account  the  importance  of the  relative  retail  prices  for  the  Member  States  in 27 
question.  At  the  time  it  was  acknowledged  that  special  measures  may  be 
necessitated by the risk of displacement of purchases. 
6.12  According to the study prepared for the Commission,  significant levels of cross-
border purchasing of petrol and diesel  continue to  occur in  Luxembourg.  The 
study does acknowledge however that hard data was difficult to obtain,  and that 
the gradual raising of rates  by  Luxembourg should  reduce the phenomenon.  In 
fact,  the  Luxembourg  rates  are  still  somewhat  lower  than  their  neighbours', 
though  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  they  are  now  above  the  existing  minima 
(and, in the case of petrol, well above the minima) . 
6.13  In  the heating  fuel  area,  a  major problem  exists  in  that  some  heating  fuels  are 
subject to  excise duty,  whereas other,  directly competing products (e.g.  natural 
gas, coal) are not.  This raises two questions from a competition viewpoint.  The 
first  is  a  general  question,  as  to  what  should  be  the  appropriate  competitive 
relationship between the various heating fuels.  This can  only be assessed in  the 
light of a wide range of relevant policies and objectives which can influence fiscal 
treatment of fuels.  The second,  more specific issue,  is  the problem of how  to 
adjust  the  minimum  rates  of  duty  without  inadvenently  influencing  the 
competitive situation.  The Commission's Green Paper on Energy Policy confirms 
that increasing  the  minimum  rates  of duty on  heating  fuels  currently  subject  to 
excise duty would distort their competitive relationships with products outside the 
scope of the duty. 
6.14  The marked contrast between the adjustments made by Member States to rates on 
motor fuels  and  heating  fuels  would  appear to  confirm,  as  indicated above,  that 
exclusion  of certain  products  from  the  duty  base  limits  the  freedom  to  adjust 
national rates.  It would also suggest that  scope  for adjustment of the  minimum 
rates is similarly limited. 
6.15  As  regards  fraudulent  activity  in  the  heating  fuel  sector,  there  is  evidence  to 
suggest that the low  retail  price of heating gas oil in  Belgium  and  Luxembourg 
(which is at least partially due to  the application of the monitoring charge in  lieu 
of a  "true"  excise duty)  is  producing  trade distortion,  with  diversion  of orders 
from  France and,  to  a  l~sser extent,  Germany.  Moreover,  significant fraud  has 
been  reported in  France as a result of deliveries there of heating gas oil taxed at 
Belgian rates. 
6.16  As  indicated  above,  the Commission  engaged a  firm  of consultants to  study  the 
relative  merits of zero  rates  and  monitoring  charges  for  excisable  goods.  The 
consultants  concluded  that,  as  a  tool  to  aid  control  of  heating  gas  oil,  the 
monitoring  charge  serves  no  purpose.  Firstly,  strong  control  measures  have 
traditionally  applied  to  heating  gas  oil,  in  view  of the  risk of diversion  within 
national  markets,  to  use as a propellant.  (Indeed,  ironically, because of this  risk 
of substitution,  it  appears  that  the  lower  the  charge  the  greater  the  need  for 
control.)  Secondly, no significant difference was found  by the consultants in  the 
control of products subject to a monitoring charge and those subject to a zero rate, 
where both product categories are subject to control and movement formalities. d) 
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Wider Treaty objectives  .  . 
At a general level, environmental policy would favour a substantial increase in  the 
level  of excise  duties  on  mineral  oils  and  extension  of the  duty  to  products 
currently  not covered.  The main  motivations  are a  reduction  in .the  levels  of 
harmful  emissions  and  the  internalisation  of external  costs.  In  the  case  of 
emissions, clearly any initiative aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emission levels 
would  be  welcome.  However,  reducing  levels  of other  potentially  harmful 
emissions,  including  NOx,  CO,  hydrocarbons,  S02,  and  particulates,  is  also  an 
objective. 
Internalisation of external costs is a key issue of energy policy.  The recent Green 
Paper on Energy Policy has highlighted this point, and has identified excise duties 
as  having  a  potential  role  to.  play  in  this  process.  Diversification  of energy 
sources,  reducing  dependency on  imports  from  outside the  European  Union  are 
also considered important.  Finally, encouragement of greater energy efficiency is 
considered to  be desirable.  This  would  apply  to  both  fuels  themselves  and  the 
equipment in which they are used. 
Energy  and  environmental  concerns  came  together  in  the  form  of  the 
Commission's proposal for a carbon/energy tax13,  which was not adopted by the 
Council.  At the European Council meeting in  Essen in  December  1994,  it was 
concluded  that  the  possibility  of introducing  a  form  of carbon/energy  taxation 
with  some degree of optionality should be explored.  The Commission has  since 
presented an amended proposal to  Council.  similarly, energy,  environmental and 
agricultural  concerns  led  to  the  Commission  putting  forward  a  proposal  for  a 
reduced rate throughout the Community for biofuels.  Although this  proposal  has 
met with resistance in the Council,  the Commission remains committed to securing 
its adoption. 
Once again,  internalising  external  costs is  a key  objective  of transport policy.  A 
reduction of traffic congestion on the roads is also an important element of current 
transport policy: this implies encouraging a shift of  traffic from roads to other modes 
of transport.  A significant increase in the excise rates for road. fuels,  in addition to 
development  of the  capacity of other transport modes,  have  been  put  forward  as 
valid means of  seeking to attain these objectives.  · 
From an industrial policy viewpoint, the main preoccupation is  competitivity.  This 
applies both within the European Community, and between European industries and 
those in third countries.  In the automobile sector, there is a concern that higher fuel 
costs might lead to a downturn in  new car sales in  the Community, which could be 
detrimental  to that sector.  They would thus be concerned to see a cost/efficiency 
analysis of  any future tax measures introduced for specific purposes in the motor fuel 
area.  The differential between petrol and diesel also needs careful consideration, as 
Europe has established a world leadership in  diesel-engin~d vehicules. 
Notwithstanding the fact  that development  of the  excise  system  may  complement 
other Community policies, care must also be taken to try to avoid and/or eliminate 
unwarranted  economic  distortions  arising  from  differential  taxation  of energy 
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products across uses,  activities or sectors.  An  optimal taxation system also means 
that taxes on energy products cannot be considered in  isolation from the wider tax 
system and its impact on the allocation of  resources in the economy as a whole. 
6.23  The Commission's White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment, and 
the related conclusions of  the European Council held in Brussels in December 1993, 
identify increases in the rates of  excise duty on energy products, plus enhugement of 
the scope of the duty,  as  a  means  of funding  reductions  in  statutory charges  on 
labour. 
6.24  The wider policy areas indicated above are relevant in  the context of the overall 
approach  to  be adopted  regarding excise duty  on  mineral  oils.  Indeed,  a closer 
coordination of  all these policies must be a key element in developing the excise duty 
system.  However, there are also a number of specific considerations,  applicable 
to particular products, which should be examined.  The initial source of concern 
in  these areas is  most often located  in environmental policy,  though again  there 
can  be interaction with  other Community objectives.  The speci.fic  issues  which 
warrant examination are the differential treatment of leaded and  unleaded petrol, 
the extent of the difference between  petrol and  diesel  taxation  and,  the varying 
treatment of heavy fuel  oil depending  upon  its  sulphur content (the latter on  the 
basis of the undertaking referred to earlier). 
6.25  As  regards  the differential  treatment of leaded  and  unleaded  petrol,  there  is  an 
ECU  50  per  1,000  litres  differential  between  the  minimum  rates  for  these 
products at present.  Furthermore, Member States are obliged, under Article 4 of 
Directive 92/82/EEC,  to  apply  a  lower  rate of duty  to  unleaded  petrol  than  to 
leaded petrol.  At the time the directive was adopted, Member States agreed to be 
guided by the objective of maintaining a differential in  favour of unleaded petrol 
of ECU 50  per 1  ·,ooo litres,  though  this differential is  not legally binding on the 
Member States.  The Commission  notes  that this  rate differential of ECU 50  is 
not respected in several Member States. 
6.26  Introduction of the differential in  favour of unleaded petrol was part of an overall 
strategy  to  encourage  greater  use  of  this  product  instead  of  leaded  petrol. 
Considerable success has been achieved as a result of this strategy.  In parallel, in 
application of Directive 88176/EEC14 on measures to be taken against air pollution 
by  motor vehicules,  new  cars  must  use  unleaded  petrol  since  1 October  1990. 
Furthermore,  consumption  patterns  have  changed  to  the  extent  that  unleaded 
petrol now accounts for more than 50%  of overall petrol purchases.  This reflects 
not only  the  technical  characteristics  of new  cars,  but  also  a  major  change  in 
public opinion and attitude. 
6.27  In  the circumstances, it would now  seem  appropriate that unleaded petrol should 
be  the  fuel  to  which  a  standard  minimum  excise  rate  be  applied.  Any  rate 
differential between leaded and unleaded petrol could then be presented as a penal 
upward  adjustment  on  leaded  petrol.  Furthermore,  there  would  be  merit  in 
making  it obligatory  for  Member States  to  apply  to  leaded  petrol  a  higher  rate 
than that which they apply to unleaded petrol. 
14 Council Directive 88176/EEC of 3 December 1987 (OJ No L 36, 09.02.88). 30 
6.28  There is a large gap between petrol and diesel rates,  both in  minimum terms and 
at national rate level.  This gap has an origin in the use of diesel as a professional 
fuel for road haulage, buses, taxis etc..  A narrowing of the gap would appear to 
be justified on grounds of transport policy,  where a  shift from  road  haulage to 
train and waterways freight is advocated.  For cars, a narrowing of the gap would 
also seem possible due to the fact that diesel is  more economical than petrol,  in 
terms  of kilometres  per  litre,  which  is  already  an  incentive  to  prefer  diesel-
powered vehicules. 
6.29  In the heavy  fuel  oil sector,  there may  be merit,  for  environmental reasons,  in 
introducing  a  fiscal  advantage  for  fuel  oil  with  a  comparatively  low  sulphur 
content.  On  the other hand,  energy policy  would  suggest that  such  a  measure 
should  not be  implemented  independently of other considerations:  for example, 
some industries have installed special equipment to counter the eff~t of using fuel 
oil with a high sulphur content. 
e)  Conclusions 
6.30  Given  the various  arguments and  concerns  outlined  above,  the Commission  notes 
that,  in  general,  different  considerations  arise  in  the  motor  fuel  and  heating  fuel 
sectors. 
6.31  For  heating  fuels,  the  Commission  notes  that  there  are  strong  arguments  for 
increasing the minimum rates, but that this implies a need to extend the scope of the 
duty to products which  are not covered at present.  This  in  turn means  resolving 
difficulties  arising  from  wider Treaty objectives,  insofar  as  it  requires  a  balanced 
judgement  as  to  the  correct  competitive  relationship  between  various  products. 
Whilst,  in  principle,  it may be valid  to  apply an excise duty to natural gas,  it  may 
equally  be  valid,  nonetheless,  to  give  it  some  fiscal  advantage  over  other  fuels. 
These are issues which will need detailed consideration before final  positions can be 
adopted.  Accordingly,  the  Commission  concludes  that  these  issues  should  be 
covered  in  the wide-ranging  consultation  process  described  previously.  Such  an 
approach would also enable account to be taken of discussions on the Green Paper 
on Energy Policy, which is expected to lead to a White Paper by the end of 1995 and 
of the role  which  excise duties  can  play  in  furthering  environmental  policies  at  a 
Community level. 
6.32  As  regards  the  specific  review  requirements  ansmg  from  Council  Decision 
93/697/EEC, the Commission is of the view that the specific requirement to review 
the treatment of heavy fuel  oil  by reference to sulphur content should be covered in 
the  overall  review  of the  treatment  of heating  fuels,  following  the  consultation 
process.  As  regards the relief for mineral  oils used in the production of alumina in 
Sardinia,  the Commission  believes  that  this  matter would  best be  reviewed  in  the 
context of the overall review,  as  provided for under Article 8 (6) of that directive, 
covering  exemptions  and  reduced  rates  granted  under  article  8  (4)  of Directive 
92/81/EEC.  In the meanwhile,  the Commission considers that the Council  should 
look  favourably  upon  requests  to  renew  these  particular  derogations  until 
31  December 1996.  Furthermore, in view of the interest shown by Member States, 
the Commission believes that an overall review as provided for under article 8(7) of 
the same directive covering exemptions under paragraphs  1  (b) and 2(b) of article 8 
could usefully take place at the same time. 31 
6.33  Given the close links between the minimum rates for heating fuels and for fuels used 
in accordance with Article 8(3) of Directive 92/81/EEC, it  is equally recommended 
that action be deferred in this area until after the consultation process. 
6.34  In  the  motor fuel  area,  where  all  competing  products  are  subject  to  duty,  the 
Commission believes that there are a number of aspects which need to be analysed 
further,  including  in  particular the  relationship  between  petrol  and  diesel,  and  the 
appropriate  difference  in  fiscal  treatment of leaded  and  unleaded  petrol.  Such  a 
review of the treatment of motor fuels  should be considered in  the context of the 
consultation process, with a view to developing a more coherent overall strategy for 
the future. 
6.35  The Commission concludes that, in any future proposals in this area, the opportunity 
should be taken to ensure that unleaded petrol be presented as the fuel  to which. a 
standard  minimum excise rate be applied.  Any  rate differential between leaded 
and unleaded petrol which  might be judged appropriate should then  be presented 
as a penal upward adjustment on leaded petrol. 
6. 36  The Commission notes that all Member States have increased their national rates 
of duty on motor fuels without the pressure of increased minimum rates.  Indeed, 
as  noted  above,  an  increase of 20%  in  the  minimum  rate  for  unleaded  petrol 
would be nec.essary,  simply to keep pace with national rates for this product.  On 
the other hand,  as  all  Member States  have  increased  their rates,  very  little rate 
approximation  has  occurred.  Rather  than  simply  proposing  an  increase of the 
minimum  rates at this  stage,  the Commission believes that the issue needs  to  be 
examined  to  see  wh~ther other,  complementary  measures  might  be  needed  to 
assist the approximation process. 32 
ANNEXA 
EXCISE RECEIPTS AS A % OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCI 
(1992) 
Excise Receipts  Total Tax Receipts  Excise as% 
as% ofGDP  as% ofGDP  of Total Tax 
Belgium  2.3%  45.7%  5.0% 
Denmark  4.1%  48.8%  8.4% 
Gennany  2.8%  42.5%  6.6% 
Greece  4.4%  41.1%  10~7% 
Spain  2.5%  36.8%  6.8% 
France  2.6%  43.7%  5.9% 
Ireland  6.0%  37.1%  16.2% 
Italy  3.7%  41.9%  8.8% 
Luxembour&  4.5%  49.2%  9.1% 
Netherlands  2.7%  47.8%  5.6% 
Portu&al  4.5%  35.7%  12.6% 
United 
3.7%  34.0%  10.9%  Kin&dom 33 
ANNEXB 
MINIMUM RATES OF EXCISE DUTY 
PRODUCT  MINIMUM RATE 
TOBACCO PRODUCTS 
Cigarettes  Combination of specific and ad valorem 
elements, the minimum incidence of which 
should not be less than 57% of retail selling 
price (most popular price cate£ory) 
Fine cut smo~ing  tobacco for rolling  30% of retail selling price or ECU 20 per 
cigarettes  kilogram 
Cigars & cigarillos  5%  of retail selling price or ECU 7 per 1, 000 
items or per kilo2ram 
Other smoking tob~co  20%  of retail selling price or ECU 15 per 
kilogram 
ALCOHOL PRODUCTS 
Wine  ECU 0 per hectolitre of product 
(still & sparkling) · 
lntennediate products  ECU 45 per hectolitre of product 
Beer  ECU 0. 748 per hectolitre/degree plato or. 
ECU 1.87 per hectolitre/degree of alcohol of 
finished product 
Spirits  ECU 550 per hectolitre of pure alcohol 
(ECU 1000 for Member States above this 
limit) 
MINERAL OIL PRODUCTS 
Motor fuels 
Unleaded petrol  ECU 287 per 1  ,000 litres 
Leaded petrol  ECU 337 per 1,000 litres 
Diesel  ECU 245 per 1  ,000 litres 
Kerosene  ECU 245 per 1  ,000 litres 
LPG + Methane  ECU 100 per l 000 kg  ·-
Heating fuels 
Gas oil  ECU  18(5)1 per 1,000 litres 
Kerosene  ECU 0 per 1  ,000 litres 
LPG + Methane  ECU 0 per 1,000 kg 
Heavy fuel  oil  ECU  13 per 1,000 kg 
An. 8(3) uses 
Gas oil  ECU  18 per 1,000 litres 
Kerosene  ECU 18 per 1,000 kg 
LPG + Methane  ECU 36 per 1  ,000 kg 
1.  Monitoring charge of ECU 5 per 1,000 litres applicable for Belgium and Luxembourg. r= 
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EXCISE  DUTY RATES 
DIESEL  (per  1000 litre) 
EL  ES  F  IRL  I  L  NL 
,-] 
L  1.1.1991  ~  1.1.1992 
L=:J  1.1.1994  18 1.1.1995 
-·  I 
p  UK 
II 
> 
~ 
~ 
t!I!J 
>< 
n  - 00  ""'  - -MEMBER 
STATE 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembour2 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
EU-min 
WINE 
DEVELOPMENT OF EXCISE RATES 
BETWEEN 1.1.1993 AND 1.1.1995 
EXCISE 1.1.93  EXCISE 1.1.95  %CHANGEIN 
(ECU 1.10.92)  (ECU 3.10.94)  ECUTERMS 
36,28  37,22  3% 
86,10  86,95  1% 
·o,oo  0,00  0% 
0,00  0,00  0% 
0,00  0,00  0% 
3,31  3,35  1% 
271,88  271,58  0% 
0,00  0,00  0% 
0,00  0,00  0% 
48,51  49,94  3% 
- 0,00  -
0,00  0,00  0% 
- 284,24  -
- 284,30  -
165,89  179,58  8% 
0,00  0,00  0% 
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ANNEX D(1) 
%CHANGE IN 
NATIONAL 
CURRENCY 
. TERMS 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
5% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
-
0% 
-
-
6% 
0% MEMBER 
STATE 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembour2 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
EU-min 
BEER 
DEVELOPMENT OF EXCISE RATES 
BETWEEN 1.1.1993 AND 1.1.1995 
(IN ECU PER HL/DEGREE PLATO OF FINISHED PRODUCT) 
EXCISE 1.1.93  EXCISE 1.1.95  %CHANGE IN 
(ECU 1.10.92)  (ECU 3.10.94)  ECUTERMS 
1,46  1,49  3% 
3,29  3,32  1% 
0,79  0,80  1% 
0,95  0,82  -13% 
0,76  0,75  -2% 
0,75  0,76  1% 
9 24  8,75  -5% 
1,57  1,40  -10% 
0,79  0,81  3% 
1,65  1,82  10% 
- 1,48  -
1,22  1,31  7% 
- 11,37  -
- 10,09  -
5,24  5,53  6% 
0,75  0,75  0% 
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ANNEX D(l) 
%CHANGE IN 
NATIONAL 
CURRENCY 
TERMS 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
13% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
7% 
-
20% 
-
-
4% 
0% MEMBER 
STATE 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembour2 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
EU-min 
SPIRITS 
DEVELOPMENT OF EXCISE RATES 
BETWEEN 1.1.1993 AND 1.1.1995 
EXCISE 1.1.93  EXCISE 1.1.95  %CHANGE IN 
(ECU 1.10.92)  {ECU 3.10.94)  ECUTERMS 
1566,03  1606,68  3% 
3662_, 13  3698,49  1% 
1315,95  1326,65  1% 
549,12  550,00  0% 
578,31  551,59  -5% 
1174,32  1381,45  18% 
2676,78  2757,34  3% 
662,90  593,32  -10%' 
1011,14  1037,39  3% 
1433,96  1540,05  7% 
- 739,26  -
726,86  715,15  -2% 
- 5016,08  -
- 5131,68  -
2484,66  2634,06  6% 
550,00  550,00  0% 
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ANNEX D(3) 
%CHANGE IN 
NATIONAL 
CURRENCY 
TERMS 
0% 
0% 
0% 
16% 
10% 
16% 
9% 
0% 
0% 
4% 
-
10% 
-
-
4% MEMBER 
STATE 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembour2 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
EU-min 
UNLEADED PETROL 
DEVELOPMENT OF EXCISE RATES 
BETWEEN 1.1.1993 AND 1.1.1995 
EXCISE 1.1.93  EXCISE 1.1.95  %CHANGE IN 
(ECU 1.10.92)  (ECU 3.10.94)  ECUTERMS 
374,86  409,89  9% 
293,26  381,80  30% 
423,17  509,85  20% 
409,92  389,04  -5% 
365,06  361,60  -1% 
426,12  544,70  28% 
348,37  345,82  -1% 
478,13  471,43  -1% 
267,83  354,48  32% 
438,36  502,43  15% 
293,98  333,40  13% 
474,29  442,88  -7% 
3.90,28  456,97  17% 
523;98  440,63  -16% 
323,09  400,48  24% 
287,00  287,00  0% 
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ANNEX D(4) 
%CHANGE IN 
NATIONAL 
CURRENCY 
TERMS 
7% 
29% 
20% 
10% 
14% 
26% 
5% 
10% 
29% 
11% 
11% 
4% 
12% 
5% 
22% 
0% MEMBER 
STATE 
Bel2ium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembour2 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portu2al 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
EU-min 
LEADED PETROL 
DEVELOPMENT OF EXCISE RATES 
BETWEEN 1.1.1993 AND 1.1.1995 
EXCISE 1.1.93  EXCISE 1.1.95  %CHANGE IN 
(ECU 1.10.92)  (ECU 3.10.94)  ECUTERMS 
447,61  479,47  7% 
378,04  467,29  24% 
474,77  561,88  18% 
469,05  406,10  -13% 
401,21  393,68  -2% 
481,34  584,77  21% 
382,49  378,16  -1% 
528,42  527,32  0% 
331,95  407,62  /  23% 
500,53  566,45  13% 
355,38  406,59  14% 
542,86  478,64  -12% 
462,16  532,21  15% 
592,86  498,01  -16% 
383,55  462,11  20% 
337,00  337,00  0% 
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ANNEX D(5) 
%CHANGE IN 
NATIONAL 
CURRENCY 
TERMS 
4% 
22% 
17% 
6% 
13% 
20% 
4% 
11% 
20% 
10% 
12% 
-1% 
10% 
5% 
18% 
0% MEMBER 
STATE 
Bel2ium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembour2 
Netherlands· 
Austria 
•. 
Portu2al 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
EU-min 
DIESEL OIL USED AS PROPELLANT 
DEVELOPMENT OF EXCISE RATES 
BETWEEN 1.1.1993 AND 1.1.1995 
EXCISE 1.1.93  EXCISE 1.1.95  %CHANGE IN 
(ECU 1.1  0.92)  (ECU 3.10.94)  ECUTERMS 
278,68  296,03  6% 
266,58  299.49  12% 
283,83  322,56  14% 
~  268,03  245.71  -8% 
269,64.  262,24  -3% 
251,61  326,00  30% 
Z97,33  297,46  0% 
361,70  349,82  -3% 
'204,69  253,02  24% 
250,51  295,09  18% 
218,86  243,22  11% 
297,14  315,18  6% 
185,79  298,46  61% 
.372, 73  313,10  -16% 
315,32  400,48  27% 
245,00  245,00  0% 
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ANNEX D(6) 
%CHANGE IN 
NATIONAL 
CVRRENCY 
TERMS 
4% 
11% 
13% 
6% 
12% 
28% 
6% 
8% 
20% 
14% 
9% 
19% 
53% 
5% 
25% 
0% MEMBER 
STATE 
Belaium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
LuxembourK 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portu1al 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
EU-min 
GAS OIL-REA TING PURPOSES 
DEVELOPMENT OF EXCISE RATES 
BETWEEN 1.1.1993 AND 1.1.1995 
EXCISE 1.1.93  EXCISE 1.1.95  %CHANGE IN 
(ECU 1.10.91)  (ECU 3.10.94)  ECUTERMS 
5,00  5,31  6% 
22990  299,49  30% 
41.28  41.62  1% 
153,72  133.09  -13% 
. 79;52  76.72  -4% 
63,99  73,80  15% 
49,71  47,11  -5% 
361,70  349,82  -3% 
5,18  5.31  .  3% 
46,29  47,66  3% 
46 89  48,05  2% 
0,00  0,00  -
19,40  33,91  75% 
197,17  168 78  -14% 
16,93  27,37  62% 
18,00  18,00  0% 
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ANNEXD(7) 
o/o  CHANGE IN 
NATIONAL 
CURRENCY 
TERMS 
4% 
29% 
0% 
0% 
11% 
14% 
00/o 
8% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
67% 
7% 
59% 
0%. MEMBER 
STATE 
'· 
Bel1ium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
'· 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portu2al 
Finland 
Sweden 
UK 
EU-min 
HEAVY FUEL OIL 
DEVELOPMENT OF EXCISE RATES 
BETWEEN 1.1.1993 AND 1.1.1995 
EXCISE 1.1.93  EXCISE 1.1.95  %CHANGEIN 
(ECU 1.10.91)  (ECU 3.10.94)  ECUTERMS 
. 
18,50  18,98  3%  . 
260.27  262 85  1% 
15.48  15,61  1% 
47.30  40,95  -13% 
13,01  13,08  1% 
19.35  21_~_73  12% 
l0.13  13,39  32% 
52.03  46,57  -10% 
18,50  18,98  3% 
15,43  15,91  3% 
14,45  14,79  2% 
•51.43  28,10  -45% 
1~.26  34,19  87% 
207,55  177 66  -14% 
13,17.  21,23  61% 
13,00  13,00  0% 
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ANNEXD(B) 
% €BANGE IN 
NATIONAL 
CURRENCY 
TERMS 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
16% 
11% 
39% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
-39% 
79% 
7% 
58% 
0% CURRENCY 
Belgium franc 
Danish krone 
German mark 
Greek drachma 
Spanish peseta 
French franc 
Irish _pound 
Italian lira 
Luxemburg franc 
Dutch ~Jder 
Austrian shilling 
Portuguese escudo 
Finnish mark 
Swedish krona 
UK sterling 
DEVELOPMENT OF EXCHANGE RATE BETWEEN 
THE ECU AND NATIONAL CURRENCIES 
VALUE OF 1 ECU 
01.10.92  01.10.93  03.10.1994 
40,5484  41,3455  39,5224 
7,60759  7,71643  7,53281 
1,93777  1,90933  1 92213 
253,707  274,904  293,028 
138,333  154,073  159 014 
6,65065  6,65763  6,5S8~  1 
0,750341  0,815414  0,791706 
1729,67  1857,14  1932,52 
40,5484  41  3455  39,5224 
2,21624  2 14447  2}_15253 
13,8444  13,4339  13,5271 
174,999  196,425  195 763 
6,25968  6_}_81121  5,98076 
7,40482  9,475  9,23674 
0,797291  0,779574  0,782062 
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ANNEXE 
%CHANGE 
OVERA2-
YEAR· 
PERIOD 
2,5% 
1,0% 
0,8% 
-15_,_5% 
-15,0% 
.  1,4% 
-5,5% 
.  -11,7% 
2,5% 
~9% 
2,3% 
-11,9% 
4,_5% 
-24,7% 
1,9% Bel1lum 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembur1 
Netherlands 
Portue;al 
United Kln&dom 
EUR12 
Source:  Eurostat 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX- % INCREASE 
1993-1994 
(NATIONAL CURRENCIES) 
1993  -1994 
2.8  2.4 
1.3  2.0 
4.1  3.0 
14.5  10.9 
4.6  4.7 
2.1  1.8 
1.4  2.3 
4.5  4.0 
3.6  2.2 
2.1  2.8 
6.5  5.2 
1.6  2.5 
3.4  3.1 
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ANNEXF 
Cumulative 
5.3 
3~3 
7.2 
27.0 
9.5 
3.9 
3.7 
8.7 
5.9 
5.0 
12.0 
4.1 
6.6 Sl 
ANNEXG 
CIGARETrE EXCISE RATES 
FOR 1,000 CIGARETI'ES OF niB  MOST POPt.n.AR PRICE CATEGORY 
Retail selling  VAT  EXCISE 
Member  price (RSP) 
State  most popular  As% of  Specific excise  Ad valorem  Total excise duty 
category  RSP  in ecu  As
0 % of  As  %  of  inecu  As~  of 
total tax1>  RSP  RSP2> 
BelJiium  116,39  17 01%  9_._03  10,38%  50,00%  67,23  57,76% 
Denmark  192,49  2000%  80 ss  50,38%  21,22%  121,40  63,07% 
Germany  127,46  13,04~  43  18  47,24%  24,80%  74,79  58,68% 
Greece  81,90  15,25%  2.98  5100~  53,_86%  47,09  51,50% 
Spain  39,30  13,79%  2,52  9,12%  50,00%  22,17  56 40% 
France  125,79  15,68~  4,72  5,04%  54,95%  73,84  58,70% 
Ireland  173,04  17  36~  72 26  54,99%  16,82%  101,37  58,58% 
Italy  80 21  IS 97%  2,93  5,00%  53,35%  45,72  57,00% 
Luxembunr  88  OS  10,71%  3,04  s  02%  54,50%  51  02  57 95% 
Netherlands  104,99  14,89%  37 75  50,01%  21,05%  59 85  57,00% 
Austria  107,19  16,67%  17,15  21,72%  41,00%  61  10  51,00% 
Portugal  66,41  14,53%  7,42.  13,67%  56,00%  4460  67,17% 
Finland  166,37  18,03%  12,S4  9 97%  50,00%  95 72  57,54% 
Sweden3>  165,10  20,00%  81  20  71,09%  0,00%  81,20  49,18% 
UK  172,62  14,98%  73,70  54,97%  20,00%  108,23  62,70% 
I)  Must be between 5 and 55%. 
2>  Must not be less than 57%. 
J)  Sweden has a derogation and need not apply the ad valorem tax until 1996 and need not be above 
the 57%-level before 1999. ISSN 0254-1475 
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